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Abstract: Tacitus is the only Roman historian who devoted his works to such an extent to 
Rome’s eastern neighbor – the Parthian Empire. Scholars have researched the problem of Taci-
tus’ attitude towards the Parthians on many occasions. It seems that what is the most important 
question is not Tacitus’ opinion, but the perspective from which he looked at this topic com-
bined with the source he used when describing the Parthians and their history. Another interest-
ing question is also how deep Tacitus’ knowledge was of the past of the Parthian Empire and 
the history of Roman-Parthian relations. The aim of this paper is to verify what Tacitus wrote 
about the Parthians throughout his works. Without taking into account all this evidence, it is not 
possible to propose a proper evaluation or balanced observations concerning his presentation 
of the Roman-Parthian relations and internal history, society and customs of the Arsacid state 
in the first century CE.
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Among the small number of Roman historians of the early imperial period whose works 
– to varying degrees – described Roman-Parthian relations, it was Publius Cornelius 
Tacitus1 who devoted a particularly large amount of space to this issue, as well as to the 
Parthians themselves. His presentation of the panorama of the succession of events from 
the death of Augustus to that of Domitian depicts the most important political events 
taking place in the Roman Empire and beyond its borders. The external events which 
interested him the most were those with a direct or indirect effect on Roman political 
interests. In the context of these interests, the lands to the east of the imperial borders 
were the subject of many political and diplomatic forays on the part of the Roman rulers 
as they sought to contain the most dangerous rival capable of hampering them in se-
curing domination in the East – the Parthian state ruled by the Arsacid dynasty. The long 
and variable history of this rivalry explain why Tacitus occupied himself so much in his 
major historical works (Historiae and Annales) with the events playing out in Armenia, 
the Caucasus, and the Parthian state.
1 PIR2 C 1467; Oliver 1977, 64–70; Birley 2000, 230–234.
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The first of these to be published was the Historiae, which Tacitus wrote over the 
first decade of the 2nd century CE, during the rule of Emperor Trajan.2 Twelve volumes 
of this work probably existed, presenting the history of the Roman Empire in the years 
69–96 CE; yet only the first four, and part of the fifth, survive. These books contain 
a description of the rivalry for rule in Rome of 69–70 CE, between Galba, Otho, Vitel-
lius and Vespasian, while Tacitus’ narrative consigns other, contemporaneous events to 
the background. Still, though, the books mention the Parthians a few times,3 so there 
is no reason to doubt that they also featured prominently in the lost volumes of the Hi­
storiae, if only because the rule of the Flavian dynasty was characterized by frequently 
tense relations between Rome and its eastern neighbor.4 These tensions were still less 
common, however, than during the rule of the Julio-Claudian dynasty.5
The Annales appeared several years later, during the rule of Emperor Hadrian.6 In 
this work, Tacitus presented the history of the reign of the rulers of the Julio-Claudian 
dynasty, from the death of Augustus to that of Nero. This work too is incomplete – only 
12 books remain, in whole or in part, of the original 18 or 16.7 There are numerous refer-
ences to the Parthians in the Annales. One could go as far as to say that they are among 
the fundamental sources of knowledge on Roman-Parthian relations in the period from 
Tiberius to Nero.8 We should add that it was not just in his historical works that Tacitus 
wrote about the Parthians – he also mentioned them in the Germania (17; 37), a treatise 
on the ethnography of the Germanic tribes.
The question of Tacitus’ attitude towards the Parthians has already occupied many 
scholars who are particularly interested in the issue of his perception and assessment of 
them.9 I would argue, however, that what is important is not just what Tacitus thought 
of the Parthians, but above all what he knew about them and about Roman-Parthian re-
lations, and which sources he used. By reflecting on these questions, we will not seek 
to interpret his work from the point of view of our current knowledge on the events that 
he describes. This requires a review – in chronological order – of Tacitus’ information 
about the domestic situation in the Parthian state as well as its rulers’ external political 
activity, and in particular of the elements of his narrative that refer to the Parthian rivalry 
with Rome over Armenia and the mutual relations between these states. We shall begin 
this review with the information contained in the Annales.
2 Cf. Syme 1958, 117–120; Birley 2000, 241.
3 See Hist. 1,2,1; 82,3; 4,51,1–2; cf. also 5,8,2–3; 9,1. 
4 Cf. Debevoise 1938, 201–202; Dąbrowa 1981; 1994.
5 See Syme 1958, 211–216.
6 On the time when the Annales was written, see Syme 1958, 467–474; Potter 1991, 287–290; Birley 
2000, 242–246.
7 Cf. Syme 1958, 263–266.
8 We also have the account of Josephus on this period given in his Antiquitates, which is to an extent 
parallel, albeit not as detailed, and written from a different perspective: Rajak 1998, 312–323. 
9 Walser 1951, 136–154; Ehrhardt 1998, 302–304. 
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I. Vonones, Artabanus and Roman-Parthian relations in the first years 
of the rule of Tiberius
Issues related to Parthia were first raised by Tacitus in relation to the matter of Vonones, 
son of the king of Parthia, Phraates IV (Ann. 2,1,1–4,3).10 He found himself in Rome, 
along with other members of Phraates IV’s family, when the latter placed them in the 
custody of Emperor Augustus.11 This decision was enforced by the internal situation in 
the royal family, torn apart by the struggle for succession between Phraates IV’s sons 
from various marriages. Queen Thea Musa, the last of several royal wives, had gained an 
influential position in the Parthian court, which allowed her to secure the throne for her 
and Phraates IV’s son Phraataces (Phraates V).12 The king, with serious concerns for the 
fate of his other sons,13 thus asked Augustus to provide refuge and care for them in Rome. 
This step was later exploited many times in Roman propaganda to emphasize Rome’s su-
premacy over its eastern neighbor. However, Tacitus himself makes it clear that Phraates 
IV’s decision was enforced by the domestic situation in his state, and not by pressure from 
Rome (Ann. 2,1,2).14 Following the death of Phraates IV, and with the continued dynastic 
struggles, some of the Parthian aristocrats asked Augustus to send Vonones, the eldest of 
the royal sons staying in Rome, to Parthia. Augustus acceded to this request, and also of-
fered the support necessary for this trip to succeed (Ann. 2,2,1). Yet Vonones’ rule proved 
short-lived. Having been raised in Rome, he was unfamiliar with the national traditions to 
which his Parthian subjects were attached. His lack of respect for these traditions, coupled 
with his style of governance, soon turned certain members of the Parthian elites against 
him, and they invited Artabanus (II),15 from a secondary line of Arsacids, to the throne 
(Ann. 2,2,1; 3,1). The resultant confrontation between the pretenders to the throne ended 
in the defeat of Vonones. He fled Parthia and found refuge in Armenia, where, at a difficult 
moment for the country, he secured power (Ann. 2,3,1; 4,2).16 This turn of events did not 
suit the interests of the Romans, as Vonones’ presence in Armenia meant the threat of con-
flict with Artabanus, which Tiberius, then ruler of Rome, was keen to avoid (Ann. 2,4,3).
The cited passages from the Annales shows that Tacitus had a good grasp of the 
complicated domestic situation in the Parthian Empire and Armenia in the first years 
of Tiberius’ rule. Equally importantly, he was aware of the considerable influence that 
events in the East had on the shape of Roman policy in this region as well as Rome’s 
internal affairs.17 We can only guess, as nowhere does Tacitus confirm it himself, that he 
10 PIR2 V 994; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 210–213.
11 Strabo 16,1,28 (748); Res Gestae Divi Augusti 32; cf. Josephus, AJ 18,39–42. For much more about 
this episode, see Pani 1972, 26–35; Dąbrowa 1983, 65–66, note 213; Dąbrowa 1987, 63–71; Nierdegaard 
1988, 102115; Strugnell 2008, 283–285; Scardigli 2009, 131, 132–134.
12 PIR2 P 394; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 145–147.
13 Cf. Josephus, AJ 18, 40–41.
14 Yet this does not stop Tacitus in another place from speaking of the offspring of Phraates IV as hostages; 
cf. Ann. 11,10,4 (see Malloch 2013, 172–173); 12,10,1. Other Roman authors do likewise: Vell. Paterculus 
2,94,4; Strabo 6,4,2 (288); Josephus, AJ 18,42; Suet., Aug. 21,3; 43,4; Justin 42,5,12.
15 PIR2 A 1155; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 28–34.
16 Cf. SC de Cn. Pisone patre, ll. 39–45; Josephus, AJ 18, 50.
17 Cf. Eck – Caballos – Fernández 1996, 107.
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made use of Res Gestae Divi Augusti, the works of Strabo and Pompey Trogus, which 
present Parthian-Roman relations at the time of Augustus. We find allusions to these in 
many places in his work. Yet it is unlikely that he used the work of Velleius Paterculus, 
as no elements of this historian’s work are reflected in Tacitus’ account. 
II. Germanicus’ mission to the East (18 CE) and Artabanus II
The next focus of Tacitus’ attention was the mission to the East of Germanicus, dis-
patched by Tiberius in 18 CE. According to Tacitus, this mission had two political 
objectives. One of these was closely related to the question of succession in Rome, 
while the other concerned the shape of Rome’s relations with the Parthians.18 The most 
important task given to Germanicus by Tiberius was to sort out the political situation in 
Armenia, which remained without a leader after Vonones’ deposition from the throne 
(Ann. 2,55,6). There is no doubt that this was a very significant task, as both the Roman 
and the Parthian empires were extremely keen to control Armenia owing to its strate-
gic location between the two states. Artabanus’ preoccupation with the struggle for 
leadership of Parthia made it easier for Germanicus to realize his plans. Without great 
difficulty, he placed Artaxias on the throne of Armenia.19 Despite hailing from Pontus, 
the new king was popular among the Armenians and also accepted by the Parthians 
(Ann. 2,56,2–3).20 This decision led to many years of stability in the political situation 
of Armenia.
Germanicus’ presence in the East persuaded Artabanus to forge closer contacts with 
him. His envoys visited Germanicus, invoking the friendship treaties between the two 
states21 and declaring the Parthian king’s readiness to renew them and meet with the 
Roman commander in person (Ann. 2,58,1). Germanicus exercised caution regarding 
renewal or deepening of bilateral relations, but did not refuse a meeting with the Par-
thian king (Ann. 2,58,2). One of the important topics raised was the future of Vonones, 
who was staying in Syria. Artabanus asked Germanicus to have him removed from the 
territory, arguing that he attracted people who could bring about unrest. What he prob-
ably had in mind was that Vonones’ presence in Syria made him a leader of the hostile 
oppo sition. Although Germanicus did not respond directly to this request, Artabanus 
attained his goal indirectly. Vonones’ actions in Armenia were supported by the then 
18 Elsewhere, Tacitus makes it clear that the unstable political situation in Armenia and the Parthian state 
suited Tiberius, as, by sending Germanicus to the East to safeguard Roman interests, he ridded Rome of an 
extremely popular potential rival (Ann. 2,5,1; 2,43,1–2); cf. Pani 1993, 235–255.
19 Cf. RPC I, no. 3629–3630.
20 PIR2 A 1168. He was originally called Zenon, and was one of two sons of King Polemon of Pontus 
(PIR2 P 531): Strabo 12,3,29 (C 556). Cf. Pani 1972, 188–191. We know a couple of the Zenon’s coins related 
probably to his enthronement in Armenia, see Krengel 2013, 59–73; Kovacs 2014, 19–25; 2016, 31–32.
21 Artabanus was most certainly referring to a Roman-Parthian agreement from the time of Augustus. We 
do not know which one, as the emperor in fact concluded two such agreements: one with Phraates IV (Res 
Gestae Divi Augusti 29), and the other with his son Phraataces (Dio Cassius 55,10a,4). The differing political 
context of these agreements appears to make it likely that the Parthian ruler may have been invoking the first 
one; cf. Dąbrowa 1983, 41–42, 43–44. See also Wheeler 2002, 287–291. According to S. Malloch (2013, 
123), Tac. Ann. 2,58 refers to the foedus of CE 1 with Gaius Caesar.
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governor of Syria, Piso, with whom Germanicus was in conflict.22 As a result, the im-
perial envoy ordered that Vonones be sent to Pompeiopolis, in the province of Cilicia 
adjacent to Syria. 
The passage from the Annales on Germanicus’ mission contains rather few details 
concerning Parthian issues. In it, though, Tacitus shows the influence the changing politi-
cal situation in Armenia and Germanicus’ appearance had on Artabanus’ approach. We 
do not know of any direct actions planned against the Parthians by the Roman emissary.23 
Yet there is no doubt that his very presence at the border of the Arsacid state might have 
been of such concern to the Parthian ruler that he set about persuading Germanicus of 
his friendship towards Rome, and at all cost preventing him from supporting the enemies 
of the Parthians.
III. Artabanus II’s intervention in Armenia (34 CE) and Tiberius’ 
reaction to it
The events in the East, among which those concerning the Parthians occupy a sig-
nificant place, feature prominently in the sixth book, in the part on the years 35–36 
CE (Ann. 6,31,1–37,4; 41,2–44,5). These events were of great importance for Rome’s 
eastern policy, and the Parthians played a major role in them, both directly and in-
directly. According to Tacitus, the beginning of this series of events came in 35 CE, 
when a secret delegation of the Parthian aristocracy opposed to Artabanus’ rule arrived 
in Rome.24 The envoys asked Tiberius to send Phraates,25 the next son of Phraates IV, 
to Parthia to take the Arsacid throne. They argued that Rome’s support for Phraates, 
along with his appearance in the Parthian state, were crucial in the effort to mobilize 
the opponents of Artabanus (Ann. 6,31,1–2). The words of Tacitus himself suggest 
that, after a lengthy period of comparative peace,26 the relations of Rome with the 
Parthian state worsened considerably at this point. The reason for this was the mili-
tary successes enjoyed by Artabanus, which allowed him to gain supremacy over the 
domestic opposition and pursue a more determined foreign policy, including towards 
those lands in which the Romans had a keen interest. Armenia was among the more 
important of these. Its ruler, Artaxias, died in 34 CE, and Artabanus took immediate 
advantage of this event by inserting his son Arsaces on the throne (Ann. 6,31,1).27 
Buoyed by this and other successes, he demanded of Tiberius that he give up the 
riches of Vonones, which were in Roman hands, and laid his claims to areas that had 
once been part of the Achaemenid Empire and the Alexander’s and the Seleucids’ 
22 Cf. SC de Cn. Pisone patre, ll. 37–45; Eck – Caballos – Fernández 1996, 163–165.
23 Cf. Pani 1993, 241–244.
24 For more on this delegation, as well as later ones, see Dąbrowa 1989; 2002; 2013, 58–59.
25 PIR2 396; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 147–148.
26 The fourth book of Annales ends with the events of 28 CE. Although the sixth book begins with 
the events of 31 CE, the first references to the Parthians are made only in the context of the events of 35 
CE. We might suppose, on this basis, that the relations between the two states in these years were largely 
tension-free.
27 Karras-Klapproth 1988, 25–26.
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Empire and were now in the borders of Roman Empire.28 These demands, as well as 
he way in which they were expressed, were received badly in Rome. Although a situ-
ation unfavorable to Roman interests had developed in the East, Tiberius tem porarily 
delayed making any actions. He was reluctant to involve Roman forces directly in 
local conflict, and at the same time ready to use them to his own advantage through 
the local rulers. An opportunity to take action against Artabanus arrived with the 
aforementioned delegation of Parthian aristocrats. Not only was he happy to satisfy 
their request, but he also equipped the pretender to the Arsacid throne with everything 
that might guarantee the success of his expedition. Yet Roman support for Phraates 
did not include military aid in Parthian territory,29 and his death from illness shortly 
after entering Parthian lands once and for all dashed the hopes invested in him. Upon 
receiving word of Phraates’ expedition, Artabanus disposed of the opposition leaders 
who had instigated it (Ann. 6,31,2; 32,1–2).
Tiberius was doubtless aware of the perils caused to Roman interests by the ex-
cessively energetic Artabanus. Phraates’ death did not dissuade him from realizing the 
plans he had attached to this expedition. This was what led him, on his own initiative, 
to send to Parthia another representative of the Arsacid dynasty who was in Rome at the 
time, Tiridates. The goal of this expedition was to occupy Artabanus’ forces sufficiently 
to prevent him from coming to the aid of Arsaces, the king of Armenia, which was about 
to come under attack from the ruler of Iberia, Mithridates, egged on by the Romans 
(Ann. 6,32,3).30 Recruiting Mithridates to fight for Armenia was a major success of Ro-
man diplomacy. Tiberius took advantage of the circumstance that the rulers of Iberia had 
long been interested in Armenia, but owing to the Roman-Parthian rivalry over it had not 
been able to secure success there. A further factor that Tiberius was able to make use of 
in achieving his aims was Mithridates’ rivalry with his brother Pharasmenes31 over rule 
in Iberia. The emperor entrusted the then governor of Syria, Lucius Vitellius, to realize 
this complex political plan.
Tacitus makes it clear that the two parts of Tiberius’ strategic plan were not put into 
practice at the same time. The first arena of battle was Armenia (Ann. 6,33,1), which 
Mithridates succeeded in taking control of.32 Artabanus, learning of the Iberian attack, 
dispatched succor with another son, Orodes.33 Yet his actions did not have the intended 
effect, as thanks to the political activity of Pharasmenes, who actively supported Mithri-
dates, Orodes neither managed to gather sufficient forces among allies, nor to overcome 
the Caucasus passes through which the road to Armenia led. His campaign ultimately 
finished in failure owing to the defeat at the hands of Pharasmanes (Ann. 6,33,1–35,2). 
28 Ann. 6,31,1: addita contumelia et missis, qui gazam a Vononem relictam in Syria Ciliciaque repos­
cerent; simul veteres Persarum ac Macedonum terminos, seque invasurum possessa Cyro et post Alexandro 
vaniloquentiam ac minas iaciebat. These claims constituted part of Artabanus’ political programme: Wolski 
1966, 72–73; 1991, 53; 1993, 154–155. Cf. Shayegan 2017, 433–436.
29 Ann. 6,32,1: Cupitum id Tiberio: ornat Phraaten accingitque paternum ad fastigium, destinata reti­
nens, consiliis et astu res externas moliri, arma procul habere.
30 PIR2 M 644.
31 PIR2 P 341.
32 Tacitus does not state directly that he acquired the throne of Armenia, but his reference elsewhere 
means that we can assume this to have been the case; cf. Ann. 11,8,1.
33 PIR2 O 152; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 110–111.
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Receiving news of this, Artabanus decided to go to Orodes’ aid, but at this point Vitellius 
joined the fray. His feigned preparations for an incursion into Mesopotamia led Arta-
banus to abandon the Armenian expedition – according to Tacitus, because he was keen 
to avoid war with Rome (Ann. 6,36,1). Vitellius’ continuation of the diversionary actions 
aimed against Artabanus was successful (Ann. 6,36,2): the loss of social support meant 
that the Parthian monarch was forced to seek refuge and support among the Asiatic 
peoples of the provinces of his state (Ann. 6,36,2–4).
The chronology of events presented by Tacitus suggests that only after Artabanus’ 
withdrawal did Tiridates,34 with support up to the border of the Roman Empire from 
Vitellius’ troops, begin the advance for the Arsacid crown (Ann. 6,37,1; 37,4). At first 
enthusiastically received, his rule rather soon began to encounter a negative response 
from the aristocracy. Among the causes of the divisions that opened up were com petition 
for influence with the new ruler, as well as a negative assessment of him from many 
members of this group. They brought about the restoration of the throne to Artabanus 
(Ann. 6,43,1–3), whose decisive actions against Tiridates’ supporters resulted in victory. 
Isolated, Tiridates left Mesopotamia and returned to Syria (Ann. 6,44,5).
Tacitus’ account of Tiberius’ support for the Parthian pretenders in the struggle 
with Artabanus and his diplomatic dealings over Armenia is characterized by a start-
ling array of diverse details not provided by any other Roman historians. These con-
cern both the internal situation in the Arsacid state and the whole picture of the battles 
waged in Armenia and the Caucasus. Furthermore, Tacitus paints a complete pic-
ture of Tiberius’ sophisticated diplomatic maneuvers designed to achieve beneficial 
results for the Romans. These demonstrate that at the time in the capital of the Roman 
Empire people had extensive knowledge of the political situation in various regions 
of the East. Unfortunately, at no point in his work does Tacitus mention the sources 
which he used.
IV. Gotarzes’ conflict with Vardanes
In his account of the events of 47 CE, Tacitus presents the course of the struggle for 
power between Gotarzes35 and Vardanes at length (Ann. 11,8,1–10,4),36 at the same 
time showing the activities of Roman diplomacy, as it strove to handle the internal 
Parthian conflict in a way that it would be of most benefit to Rome. The conflict 
between the two pretenders to the Arsacid throne was hugely significant for the con-
figuration of the political situation in leaderless Armenia. No doubt mindful of this 
danger, Emperor Claudius handed the country’s throne back to Mithridates of Iberia, 
a previous occupant of the throne under Tiberius who had been removed from it by 
Gaius (Caligula) (Ann. 11,8,1), and who was in Rome at the time. The complications 
of the situation in the Arsacid state were known in Rome from the letters of Pharas-
manes, ruler of Iberia and brother of Mithridates, to the Roman emperor, or Tacitus 
34 PIR2 T 237; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 176–178.
35 PIR2 G 195; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 60–64.
36 PIR2 V 259; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 186–189. 
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read it in his narrative sources, who also knew about the ‘secret’ delegation.37 The 
Roman historian’s work is all the more valuable owing to the lack of narrative sources 
of Parthian origin. It refers to the circumstances of the violent death of Artabanus, 
the son of Artabanus of the same name and his family, at the hands of his brother 
Gotarzes, as well as the further political consequences of this act (Ann. 11,8,2).38 The 
mobilization of the supporters of the murdered monarch under the command of Var-
danes caused Gotarzes to lose control over a significant part of the state – and some 
time later, after his rival’s forces had grown stronger, on the rest of his dominion. The 
only point of resistance against Vardanes’ rule remained the strongly fortified Seleu-
cia on the Tigris. The lengthy siege of the city allowed Gotarzes to take the initiative, 
managing to gather new forces and renew the struggle with his rival. Vardanes was 
forced to seek refuge as far away as Bactria (Ann. 11,8,2–4). At the same time, Mith-
ridates, backed by Rome, succeeded in taking control of Armenia, although before 
he arrived the Armenian aristocrats tried to find another candidate for monarch (Ann. 
11,9,1–2). This situation changed when Gotarzes and Vardanes unexpectedly signed 
an agreement that led to a division of their spheres of influence being determined. The 
Arsacid crown went to Vardanes, allowing him to quickly stabilize the political situ-
ation in the western provinces of his dominion; Seleucia too accepted his suzerainty 
(Ann. 11,9,3–4). Buoyed by these successes, he set about preparing to regain control 
of Armenia, but his plans were dashed by threats of war from the Syrian governor 
Vibius Marsus, as well as Gotarzes, who broke off their agreement (Ann. 11,10,1). 
For Vardanes, more important than Armenia was the need to deal with the internal 
enemy. Victory over Gotarzes had emboldened him to the extent that some of the aris-
tocrats, fearing for their own positions, ordered his assassination. Yet Vardanes’ death 
did not soothe the situation in the Parthian state. Certain aristocrats wanted to bring 
in Meherdates, grandson of Phraates IV,39 from Rome, while the majority were in 
favor of handing power back to Gotarzes. However, his ruling style and extravagance 
soon turned the Parthians against him, and they sent a secret delegation to Claudius 
requesting that Meherdates be sent (Ann. 11,10,4).
V. Meherdates’ expedition
Tacitus presents the course of this delegation and the events that followed it in detail 
in the twelfth book of Annales (12,10,1–14,3), which describes the events of 49 CE. 
Upon arrival in Rome, the Parthian emissaries presented their request for Meherdates 
to be sent. By way of justification, their arguments included the suggestion that the 
arrival of the Parthian prince, a member of the Arsacid dynasty, would prevent Gotarzes’ 
autocratic rule from being further strengthened – this had already led to the deaths of his 
closest family members and become onerous for all groups of subjects. The emissaries 
37 Ann. 11,8,1: … rex Hiberis idemque Mithridatis frater nuntiabat discordare Parthos summaque Im­
perii ambigua, minora sine cura haberi.
38 Malloch 2013, 127–130.
39 PIR2 M 443; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 73–74.
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presented it as the emperor’s duty to react favorably to their request, given the friendly 
relations between the Parthian state and Rome.40
Claudius agreed to Meherdates’ expedition, entrusting the task of supporting him to 
Gaius Cassius, the governor of Syria. Cassius took the pretender to the Arsacid throne 
to Zeugma on the Euphrates, where he was met by Parthian aristocrats and troops of the al-
lied rulers, which were to give him military support in Parthian territory (Ann. 12,12,2–3). 
Upon parting from Meherdates on the banks of the Euphrates, the Syrian governor advised 
him to act quickly in order to give himself the best chance of success. Yet his advance was 
to encounter a series of difficulties resulting from various circumstances: choosing the 
wrong road, betrayal of an ally and the wavering political stances of the Parthian aristo-
crats, many of whom, despite their declared support for Meherdates, remained supporters 
of Gotarzes. Gotarzes was in no hurry to encounter Meherdates directly, as he first need 
to gather adequate forces, but he carried out a succession of di version tactics in his op-
ponent’s camp. This proved so successful that many of Meherdates’ allies withdrew. The 
result was that Meherdates lost the battle that decided on the fate of his expedition. Soon, 
betrayed by a man from his close circles, he found himself in Gotarzes’ hands. Although 
the victor spared him his life, he mutilated him permanently, thus removing him for good 
from the rivalry for the Parthian throne (Ann. 12,12,3–14,3).
Tacitus brings the history of Meherdates’ expedition to a close with information about 
Gotarzes’ natural death (51 CE), about his successor Vonones (II) (51 CE)41 – whose rule 
he did not see as worthy of much note – and about Vologases’ taking the throne after 
him (51–c. 79/80 CE) (Ann. 12,14,4).42 According to this account, in 49–51 CE, despite 
Rome’s engagement on the side of Meherdates, relations between the two states did not 
visibly worsen.
Tacitus refers to many details in his account of the two aforementioned episodes; we 
have mentioned only the few most important ones. The most interesting of these include 
those referring to incidents that took place in Parthia. The historian’s excellent under-
standing of the domestic situation of the Arsacid state and knowledge of the names of the 
protagonists and their political positions show that he must have gained this knowledge 
from sources containing detailed and credible information, probably from some narra-
tive source(s) unknown to us or from documents kept at archives.
VI. Radamistus, ruler of Armenia, and the Parthian-Iberian rivalry 
over Armenia
On the subject of 51 CE, Tacitus devotes much space to the events in Armenia, which 
exerted a major influence on the course of Roman-Parthian relations (Ann. 12,43,1). 
Initially, these events were of a purely local nature. Yet this changed radically when 
40 The political arguments used to justify Meherdates’ candidacy are worth quoting: Ann. 12,10,2: 
veterem sibi ac publice coeptam nobiscum amicitiam, et subveniendum sociis virium aemulis cedentibusque 
per reverentiam. Ideo regum liberos obsides dari, ut, si domestici imperii taedeat, sit regressus ad principem 
patresque, quorum moribus adsuefactus rex melior adscisceretur.
41 PIR2 V 995; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 214–215.
42 PIR2 V 940; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 192–198.
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the Parthian king Vologases became involved. Rome could not fail to react to his inter-
vention, with the result that its relations with the Parthians worsened sharply and many 
years of armed conflict ensued.
What proved to be a fateful event was the attempt by Pharasmanes, ruler of Cauca-
sian Iberia, to conquer Armenia, and place his son Radamistus on the throne.43 The ruler 
of Armenia at the time was Mithridates, the brother of Pharasmanes, to whose support he 
owed his position. Fearful of Radamistus’ growing ambitions, Pharasmanes pushed him 
into action against his uncle, providing him with the support of substantial forces. Their 
rapid attack forced Mithridates to flee and take refuge in the Gorneae fortress, occupied 
by a Roman garrison. Radamistus bribed the Romans, allowing him to coax Mithri-
dates into going outside the walls, on the pretense of commencing peace negotiations. 
Yet instead he was captured treacherously, and murdered along with his closest family 
members (Ann. 12,47,1–48, 5). Upon receiving news of what had happened in Armenia, 
the governor of Syria, C. Ummidius Durmius Quadratus, demanded of Pharasmanes that 
his son and the Iberian forces supporting him leave Armenia (Ann. 12,48,1–3), but this 
decision proved hard to enforce. The procurator of Cappadocia, who was supposed to 
supervise it, was bribed by Radamistus, and instead of preventing him, he urged him 
to don his monarchical insignia (Ann. 12,49,1). The next attempt to remove Radamistus, 
made by the legate of one of the Syrian legions, was abandoned, for fear that the legion’s 
incursion into Armenian territory might trigger war with the Parthians (Ann. 12,49,2).
This concern was not unfounded: Vologases decided to exploit the unstable situation 
in Armenia to regain his former influence, with the intention of putting a representative of 
the Arsacid dynasty, his brother Tiridates, on the throne (Ann. 12,50,1).44 His ex pedition 
brought short-lived success, yet a set of unfavorable factors forced him to withdraw, and 
Radamistus once again occupied the capital of Armenia (Ann. 12,50,2). However, the 
rebellion of the Armenian population against his government forced him to flee and take 
refuge in Iberia in his father’s court (Ann. 12,50,2–51,2).
Tacitus’ account of the events in Armenia is full of details whose sources are un-
known to us, as is the case of many other events that he describes that took place in this 
country and the Parthian state. We can assume, though, that he might have known at least 
some of them from documents on the activity in the East and Syria functionaries of the 
Roman provincial administration. In his personal assessments of the events he describes, 
Tacitus is unequivocally negative regarding the conduct of the representatives of the Ro-
man authorities, stating that their corruption, ineptitude, indecision, and even reluctance 
to act were frequently at odds with Roman interests in this field.
VII. The Roman-Parthian rivalry over Armenia during Nero’s rule
Tacitus included the next part of his account of the situation in Armenia and Rome-
Parthia relations in the thirteenth book, in the part on the year 54 CE (Ann. 13,6,1–9,3), 
although he frequently went beyond this chronological framework in order to depict 
events in their full historical context (Ann. 13,9,3).
43 PIR2 R 7.
44 PIR2 T 238; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 179–184.
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The historian begins this narrative from events in Armenia, invaded by the Parthians 
as they drove Radamistus out (Ann. 13,6,1). This probably took place in Claudius’ life-
time, since the information about these events reached Rome in late 54 CE, by which 
time Nero was in power (Ann. 13,6,2–3). The emperor’s reaction to this news was to 
concentrate legions close to the borders of Armenia, instruct the rulers of Commagene 
and Judea to be ready to attack the Parthian territory, and put new rulers on the throne 
of Armenia Minor and Sophene, no doubt with the intention of having them collaborate 
with the Romans.45 Yet confrontation with Vologases did not come to pass, as he, faced 
with the appearance of a pretender to the Parthian throne in the form of his own son, 
Vardanes,46 withdrew his forces from Armenia (Ann. 13,7,2). The task of maintaining 
Roman control over Armenia fell to Cn. Domitius Corbulo, who was handed command 
over troops stationed in Cappadocia, part of the Syrian army, and placed in charge of 
vassal rulers; the governor of Syria was presented with two legions (Ann. 13,8,1–3). This 
situation became the source of rivalry and conflicts between the two. They each sepa-
rately demanded that Vologases cease military operations and demonstrate appropria te 
respect to Rome by handing over hostages (Ann. 13,9,1). Vologases acceded to these 
demands, thus easing the situation in the borderlands of Armenia, the Parthian state and 
the Roman Empire for some time. Yet this certainly does not mean that the Parthian ruler 
abandoned his plan to restore the throne of Armenia to Tiridates.47
Vologases’ next attempt to realize his Armenian plans came in 58 CE. This approach 
was motivated by a section of the Armenian population, who tended to favor the Parthia ns 
on account of numerous cultural and social similarities as well as family links (Ann. 
13,34,2). When Tiridates encroached into Armenia, Vologases offered him support. 
The main regions to come under attack were those whose population sympathized with 
Rome. The speed of the actions, and avoidance of open confrontation, made it hard for 
both the Armenians themselves and Corbulo to stop Tiridates. Events took a favorable 
turn for the Romans when they were joined in the fighting in Armenia by Pharasmanes 
of Iberia and the Moschi (Ann. 13,37,1–3).
Tiridates thus sent envoys to Corbulo to present the arguments in favor of his right 
to the throne of Armenia, which encompassed both the fact that he had previously held 
power there and Vologases’ goodwill in maintaining friendly relations with Rome. He 
also made it clear that he preferred the diplomatic approach, but that the Parthians would 
not hesitate to go to war, should the need arise (Ann. 13,37,4). The Roman commander 
was well aware that Vologases was unlikely to deliver on his threat of war, caught up 
as he was with domestic problems with the situation in Hyrcania. He therefore sug-
gested that Tiridates go directly to the emperor, but abandon the idea of military action, 
in order to create a hope of an amicable settlement to the dispute (Ann. 13,37,5). Since 
the negotia tions carried out by the emissaries failed to secure peace, a meeting between 
Tiridates and Corbulo was agreed (Ann. 13,38,1). Yet Tiridates’ fear of falling into a Ro-
45 These events took place not before around mid-55 CE. We should also take into account the time 
needed to deliver orders from Rome to all addressees and for the preparations necessary for executing them.
46 PIR2 V 260; Karras-Klapproth 1988, 189–190.
47 According to Tacitus (Ann. 13,9,1), Vologases reaped benefits from handing the hostages over: he was 
still able to prepare for war and dispose of his rivals: … Vologaeses, quo bellum ex commodo pararet, an ut 
aemulationis suspectos per nomen obsidum amoveret, tradit nobilissiomos ex familia Arsacidarum.
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man trap prevented this from coming to pass (Ann. 13,38,4–39,1). Corbulo then went on 
the offensive against all points of resistance of the supporters of Tiridates’ rule. Apart 
from the fortresses they held, this also targeted Artaxata, the Armenian capital (Ann. 
13,39,2–6). To prevent its capture, Tiridates attacked a column of Roman troops, but, 
prepared for this eventuality, they managed to contain him. Tiridates withdrew, and Cor-
bulo, expecting him to take refuge in Artaxata, set off in that direction with a section of 
his units and captured the city without a struggle (Ann. 13, 40,1–41,4). Yet he did not 
content himself with this success.
Tacitus describes the further events of 59–60 CE in the fourteenth book of Anna­
les. After levelling Artaxata, we learn, Corbulo set off for Tigranocerta, destroying the 
pockets of resistance he encountered on the way (Ann. 14,23,1–25,1). Realizing his plans 
was made easier by the fact that the Hyrcanians had successfully engaged Vologases’ 
forces, meaning that he was unable to come to his brother’s aid. Tiridates endeavored to 
continue the fight, but after meeting Roman troops on the way he abandoned attempts 
to enter Armenia (Ann. 14,26,1). The situation there took a turn for the worse for him 
and the pro-Parthian alliance: Corbulo pacified the country and placed Tigranes on the 
throne there, on the instructions of Nero himself.48 To consolidate his power, the Romans 
not only offered the protection of a garrison, but also placed under the control of vassal 
rulers the parts of Armenia that bordered with their territory (Ann. 14,26,1–2).
This state of affairs probably continued until 62 CE, as Tacitus returns to the quest-
ion of Armenia and Roman-Parthian relations in the fifteenth book, which portrays the 
events of 62–65 CE. Right up till the latter year, Vologases, absorbed in the internal 
affairs of his state, was unable to defend his brother’s interests. Only news of Tigranes’ 
aggressive actions towards the Adiabene kingdom, whose rulers accepted the suzerainty 
of the Arsacids, persuaded him to change his position (Ann. 15,1,1–3). Any further in-
activity on Vologases’ part would have threatened his interests and hit the dynasty’s 
prestige and its ruler’s authority.49 He blamed the Romans for the outbreak of armed con-
flict, placing himself in the role of protector of the endangered legacy of his ancestors, 
including Armenia. During a public feast, the king of Parthia supported his brother’s 
demands, placing the royal diadem on his head and handing him a select equestrian unit 
along with Adiabenian reinforcements to support him in the struggle to regain Armenia. 
Upon completion of the conflict with the Hyrcanians, he readied himself for an attack on 
Roman territory (Ann. 15,2,1–4).
These plans persuaded Corbulo to begin preparations for defending Syria, fearing 
that this would be the target of an attack from Vologases (Ann. 15,3,1–2). Upon receiv-
ing news of the unexpected, but unsuccessful campaign of Tiridates’ army, launched with 
the aim of regaining Armenia (Ann. 15,4,1–3), Corbulo sent a delegation to Vologases, 
demanding that he cease the offensive against Tigranes, as the Romans would attack 
Parthian territory in revenge. Owing to the difficult general strategic situation of the Ar-
sacids in both Armenia and their own state, Vologases decided to commence negotiations 
in the matter of the crown for Tiridates with Nero himself. He withdrew his army from 
48 PIR2 T 207.
49 Cf. Ann. 15,1,4: non enim ignavia magna imperia contineri; virorum armorumque faciendum certa­
men; id in summa fortuna aequius quo validius, et sua retinere privatae domus, de alienis certare regiam 
laudam esse. 
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Tigranocerta (Ann. 15,5,1–4), from which, some time later, the Roman units defending 
it also departed (cf. Ann. 15,6,2). In Rome, Corbulo’s actions were regarded as a great 
success, although there was also speculation as to what had caused the Romans to leave 
Tigranocerta (Ann. 15,6,1).
The Parthian delegation returned from Rome empty-handed, leaving Vologases with 
no option but to renew military action (Ann. 15,7,1). The account of the military options 
from this war is too extensive and detailed to analyze here.50 One important episode 
from this conflict is worthy of attention, however: the Parthian king’s siege of the Ro-
man commander Caesennius Paetus in Rhandeia. This culminated in the capitulation of 
the Roman troops defending the fortress, and a peace accord that foresaw the Romans’ 
complete withdrawal from Armenia and the possibility of Vologases sending a further 
delegation to Nero (Ann. 15,14,3; 16,2). The Parthian king exploited this situation for 
propaganda purposes, to demonstrate his power (Ann. 15,15,1–3).51 He also reached an 
agreement with Corbulo in the matter of the execution of the resolutions of the treaty 
with Paetus. This resulted in the withdrawal of Roman troops to behind the Euphrates, in 
return for the Parthians’ retreat from Armenia (Ann. 15,17,3).
The struggle for Armenia came to a head in spring 63 CE. Vologases’ delegation 
that had been sent to Rome demanded acknowledgement of Tiridates’ rights to Arme-
nia. They declared Tiridates’ readiness to accept the diadem from the emperor, although 
for religious reasons he was unable to come to Rome in person. Vologases’ suggestion 
was that the ceremony conferring rule of Armenia on Tiridates should take place before 
the legions (Ann. 15,24,1–2). Surprised by these demands, Nero, whom Paetus had not 
informed of the Romans’ true situation in Armenia, despite learning of the defeat, in-
tended to continue the war (Ann. 15,25,1–2). The Parthian envoys, dispatched without 
a response, but with gifts, left Rome convinced that if Tiridates approached the emperor 
in person, his request would be heard (Ann. 15,25,3). On Nero’s command, Corbulo 
renewed military operations and entered Armenia. There, he encountered the emissar-
ies of Tiridates and Vologases, arriving for peace talks (Ann. 15,27,1). Corbulo entered 
negotiations, hoping to bargain the best possible conditions for Rome. He argued that 
the Romans were in a much better position as they were only engaged in one conflict, 
whereas Vologases was dealing with constant domestic problems (Ann. 15,27,2).52 The 
most important moment in these talks was the meeting of Corbulo with Tiridates. The 
latter demanded this, suggesting that it take place in the place where Paetus had sur-
50 The course of this war has been the subject of numerous analyses and interpretations; cf. Debevoise 
1938, 179–202; Heil 1997, 27–141.
51 The initial conditions of the negotiations dictated by Volgases served to demonstrate the Parthian supe-
riority over the besieged Roman forces – Vologases, Pacorus and Tiridates participated in them (Ann. 15,14,1: 
Ad ea Vologaeses nihil pro causa, sed opperiendos sibi fratres Pacorum ac Tiridaten rescripsit; illum locum 
tempusque consilio destinatum, quid de Armenia cernerent; adiecisse deos dignum Arsacidarum, simul ut de 
legionibus Romanis statuerent.). It was also helped by the negotiation of the conditions of surrender not in 
the presence of the king, but through the mediation of a dignitary (Ann. 15,14,2: missi posthac Paeto nuntii et 
regis colloquium petitum, qui Vasacen praefectus equitatus ire iussit.).
52 This statement contains a clear allusion to the problems that the Parthian ruler had previously had 
in Hyrcania (Ann. 13,37,5; 14,25,2; 15,1,1; cf. Dąbrowa 1984, 141–147), as well as the current difficulties 
that were forcing him to stay in Ecbatana, making his participation in the negotiations impossible (cf. Ann. 
15,31,1) 
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rendered. Aware as he was of the significance of this choice for propaganda use, Corbulo 
assented to it (Ann. 15,28,1–3).
During this meeting, it was decided that Tiridates would take off his royal diadem 
before an image of Nero in the presence of Roman units, and would go to collect it from 
the emperor directly (Ann. 15,29,1). The diadem removal ceremony took place several 
days later, and, owing to the delay in his departure for Rome, Tiridates gave Corbulo his 
daughter as a hostage and handed him an official letter to the emperor (Ann. 15,30,2). 
Vologases too accepted this solution. But he also asked Corbulo to ensure that Tiridates 
was treated with the honors due to a member of the Arsacid family during his journey to 
Rome (Ann. 15,31).
With the information about the content of Vologases’ letter, Tacitus concludes his 
account on the Parthians in Annales. Of later events, he only mentions Tiridates’ arrival 
in the capital of the Roman Empire in passing, without devoting much attention to it. 
He only states, in the context of his account of the trials of senators accused of actions 
hostile to Nero in 66 CE, that the presence of Tiridates was used to divert the attention of 
the citizens of Rome from these trials (Ann. 16,23,2).
What is striking in Annales is not just the extensiveness, but also the detail that Taci-
tus provides in his description of the events in Armenia and the war with Vologases. 
He not only meticulously presents the course of military actions, but also paints a de-
tailed picture of the diplomatic contacts between the two sides, the ceremonial side of 
things, as well as the events taking place in the Parthian Empire itself. Tacitus’ account 
is characterized by an impressive grasp of the succession of events and the links between 
them, as well as a concise narrative, in general lacking propaganda overtones; although 
he assesses and gives his opinion on the events, he does so with great restraint. Rather 
frequently, he places the events he describes in a specific geographical context. These 
virtues of his narrative suggest that he must have gleaned much of his information not 
only from archive documents, but also from the spoken and written reports of direct 
participants in the events.53 He could only have gathered a complete picture of the events 
that took place in the East between 54 and 63 CE in the memoirs of Gnaeus Domitius 
Corbulo,54 although he never clearly states that he made use of them.55
The subject matter of the surviving books of Historiae is mostly the course of the 
rivalry between the pretenders to the imperial purple in 68–69 CE.56 As a result, there 
are only few references to the Parthians. Those that can be found are generally concise 
interjections when Tacitus describes the events taking place on various fronts.
53 One such participant in the events might have been Marius Celsus, legate of legio XV Apollinaris, 
which he led during the war with Armenia under the command of Corbulo (Ann. 15,25,3; cf. Levick 2013, I: 
543). He was the author of a work on the tactics of battle with the Parthians and a history of the civil war of 
68–70 CE: Syme 1958, 297, 682–683.
54 For testimonia and fragments see Cornell 2013, II: 1030–1033. On contents and other problems related 
to this work, cf. Levick 2013, I: 541–545.
55 Cf. Syme 1958, 297; Levick 2013, I: 544–545.
56 Tacitus’ surviving books show that he made use of the works of Roman authors, which were focused 
especially on the events played out in Rome and Italy. They were probably not interested in Parthian issues 
at all; cf. Syme 1958, 176–190.
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The first of these concerns the Parthians’ engagement in supporting the usurper claim-
ing to be Nero, who appeared in Asia Minor some time after the emperor’s death (Hist. 
1,2,1).57 Vologases supported him in the hope that the confusion the impostor caused 
in the Roman Empire would allow him to realize his own plans. Yet these hopes were 
dashed when the Roman authorities removed the usurper. Vologases’ next opportunity 
came with the outbreak of civil war in the Roman Empire, shortly after Otho had been 
proclaimed emperor. From Tacitus’ account, we only know that in spring 69 CE un-
specified actions were undertaken, with varying success, against the Parthians.58 Several 
months later, Vespasian, the commander of the Roman army in Judea, was proclaimed 
emperor. In order to be able to participate in the contest for the throne in Rome, he first 
needed to be sure that Syria, abandoned by the legions that supported him, would not 
be attacked by the Parthians. According to Tacitus, he protected himself against this 
eventuality by sending delegations to Vologases and Tiridates (Hist. 2,82,3). Hearing of 
the victory of Vespasian’s forces in the battle of Bedriacum (24–25.10.69), Vologases 
offered him Parthian support in the form of 40,000 equestrian archers. Yet Vespasian 
rejected this offer, making it clear to the king’s emissaries that the civil war in Rome 
was over (Hist. 4,51,1–2). In chronological terms, this is Tacitus’ last direct reference to 
Roman-Parthian relations in the 1st century CE.
As with the Annales, in the Historiae too Tacitus makes no mention of the source 
from which he got his information on the Parthians. We can only assume that, as in 
other cases, he made use of documents kept in archives, as well, perhaps, as Vespasian’ 
journals, which along with a description of his military activity in Judea may also have 
contained information on the situation of the East after he was acclaimed emperor by the 
legions stationed in Egypt.59
*****
The description of the events that marked the shape of Roman-Parthian relations 
scattered throughout Tacitus’ works suggests a certain random nature. Yet this is not 
the case. In the various elements of the narrative, the author refers to matters discussed 
earlier, creating a logical and chronological whole. He presents an extensive and very 
detailed description of events in Armenia and the East, with the Romans and Parthians as 
the main protagonists and the various peoples living there in secondary roles. This con-
struction of Tacitus’ account results from the convention of the annalistic narrative that 
he uses in his works. This requires some work from the reader to join the dots between 
the various episodes, but is very useful when it comes to determining the chronological 
sequence of events and the way they relate to each other.
One more feature of Tacitus’ historical writing style is worthy of note. In his main 
historical narrative, when discussing Parthian issues, and especially Roman-Parthian re-
57 Cf. Ann. 2,8,1–9,2; Suet., Nero 57,2.
58 Hist. 2,6,1: (…) tantum adversus Parthos minae, vario eventu; (…); cf. Dąbrowa 1981.
59 Cf. Syme 1958, 178.
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lations, he generally avoids any references, comparisons or assessments of the period 
outside of the chronological framework in question. His references to events that took 
place at other times are few and far between. They refer mostly to the period of the 
Republic: the expedition of Crassus (Germ. 37; Ann. 2,2,2), the battles waged with the 
Parthians by P. Ventidius Bassus (Germ. 37; Hist. 5,9,1), the expedition of Mark Antony 
(Hist. 2,2,2; 3,24,2), the results of his activity in Armenia (Ann. 2,3,1–2), and the ac-
complishments of Augustus (Ann. 2,1,2; 2,4,1; 12,11,1). Yet there is a lack of any allu-
sions to the relations between the two states from his time, for example from the rule of 
Trajan or Hadrian.
We can assume that avoiding such allusions was intentional on Tacitus’ part. The an-
nalistic narrative style forced him to concentrate on the chronology of events of a strictly 
specified time frame. Anything outside of this infringed this concept, as inclusion of 
other contents distracted the reader’s attention and took away from the necessary dra-
matic nature of the account. Besides, the few allusions mentioned above were generally 
made outside of the main narrative thrust, as interjections to the list of facts on the strug-
gle for Armenia in the period before Tiberius’ rule (Ann. 2,3,1–2,4,3), the history of legio 
III Gallica (Hist. 3,24,2), the history of Judea (Hist. 5,9,1), or as a comparison of the 
national characteristics of the Germanic tribes and Parthians (Germ. 37).
We have no reason to believe that the lack of more such references is proof that Taci-
tus lacked knowledge of other periods of Parthian history. The cited allusions to events 
from the time of the Republic show that he certainly had a good grasp of Roman-Parthian 
relations in that period too. We can assume that his knowledge of the history of the Par-
thians went well beyond the second half of the 1st century BCE. This is demonstrated by 
his reference to the Parthian activity during the era of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, which 
prevented the ruler from suppressing the Maccabean revolt (Hist. 5,8,2–3).
Yet Tacitus’ knowledge of the Parthians was not limited to the history of their state 
and their rivalry with Rome over Armenia. On a number of occasions, he also shows 
a knowledge of their customs, social and political relations, state institutions, art of war, 
political ideology, etc.60 He no doubt gained a certain amount of knowledge by studying 
geographical and historical works by Greek and Roman authors, including Strabo61 and 
Pliny the Elder.62 The main source of Tacitus’ knowledge, however, was probably – as 
suggested several times above – a work by an anonymous author written not later than 
in the second half of the first century CE. Even if the Roman historian was able to find 
a great deal of information on the internal affairs of the Parthian state in archive docu-
ments and the journals of Roman commanders, the detailed knowledge of events and the 
behavior of their participants that he exhibits makes it doubtful that these were his only 
sources.63 This is what suggests that he probably made use of some hitherto unidentified 
60 Ehrhardt 1998, 298–302.
61 Cf. Dąbrowa 2015.
62 Cf. Hackl et al. 2010, II, 307–313.
63 This information cannot have come from any of the works we know, whose authors discussed Parthian 
matters at great length or made them their main focus – they included Pompey Trogus, Strabo (whose work 
was on the geography of the Parthian state), Artemidorus of Artemita, and Isidore of Charax. Chronologically, 
these were in much earlier times. At best, the narrative of some of them ended in the era of Augustus or the 
first years of Tiberius’ rule. 
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work written by an author with a very good knowledge of Parthian realities. This ex-
tensive understanding of issues connected with various aspects of the Parthian state and 
its politics means that we can assume that this anonymous author was probably not of 
Roman origins.64 As Tacitus makes no reference to his sources, this hypothesis, though, 
very attractive, is difficult to verify.
It is notable to that Tacitus avoids any commentaries of an ethnological nature on 
the Parthians.65 The observations on Parthian customs that appear from time to time are 
mostly used to illustrate the factors determining their social behavior.66
An important characteristic of Tacitus’ work is the perception of the Parthians as 
a worthy rival of Rome. Although he does not eschew negative assessments and opinions 
in this matter,67 Tacitus avoids solely presenting the Roman point of view in his version 
of events, instead trying to show the reasons for the actions of the adversary. A certain 
conviction of the civilizational superiority of Rome is evident in his assessments, but this 
does not diminish the value of the picture of the Parthians and their political activity in 
the 1st century CE that he paints. This picture is exceptional in being one of the fullest 
that we have, not only of this period, but also of the whole of Roman historiography. 
We should remember, though, that Tacitus was certainly not motivated by the intention 
of presenting a complete history of the Parthians and the structure of their state to the 
Roman reader. He always looked at everything concerning the Eastern neighbor from 
a Roman perspective, through the prism of the Roman-Parthian rivalry for influence in 
Armenia and domination in the East.
One of the possible reasons for which Tacitus devoted so much space and attention 
to the Parthians in his works might have been a desire to mitigate the unfavorable im-
pression given by the failure of Trajan’s expedition against the Parthians and Hadrian’s 
Parthian policy.68 By portraying a broad panorama of the difficult struggles with the 
Arsacids faced by previous rulers of Rome, he might have been hoping to persuade his 
readers that both emperors had done everything they could to protect Roman interests, 
even if the ultimate result of their endeavors was somewhat lacking.69
64 He certainly was not Josephus. Although his Antiquitates and Bellum Judaicum contains many lengthy 
passages on Parthian issues in the 1st century CE (cf. AJ 18, 39–52; 96–104; 325–339; 353–357; 371–379; 
20, 54–74; 81–93; BJ 7, 220–242; 244–251), his account varies in many important details from that given by 
Tacitus. For this reason, we can probably rule out the possibility that Tacitus knew and made use in his nar-
rative of Josephus’ works. On the other hand, Josephus’ good grasp of the political and social history of the 
Parthians, evident in his Antiquitates, might suggest that he too owed it to a source that is not widely known 
whose author gave much attention not only to the history of the Parthians but also to the fate of the Jews in 
their state; cf. Täubler 1904; Colpe 1974, 97–108; Goodblatt 1987, 605–622; Rajak 1998, 315–323. 
65 Cf. Walser 1951, 72–74.
66 Cf. Ann. 2,2,1–4; 6,43,3.
67 The source of Tacitus’ critical opinions and assessments of the Parthians is his perception of them 
as barbarians not always capable of appreciating and accepting the benevolence of Roman culture and the 
associated values system, and given to conduct not in keeping with the principles to which the Romans 
adhered; cf. Ann. 2,2,1–4; 6,32,1; 12,11,2; 12,12,2; 12,14,3; 13,38,2. See also Walser 1951, 67–72; Ehrhardt 
1998, 304.
68 Cf. Potter 1991, 290; Birley 2000, 242.
69 I would like to thank Dr. S.J.V. Malloch for valuable comments to preliminary draft of this paper. Any 
error of fact or interpretation is solely responsibility of the author. 
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